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The Multinational Enterprise and United States
Foreign Economic Policy
JACK N. BEHRMAN*
Foreign economic policy of the United States has basically not
recognized the multinational enterprise (ME)' as a distinct and useful
private institution in the international economic arena. It continues to
disregard the ME's special characteristics and to meld it into all other forms
of foreign direct investment under the catchall and nondiscriminating title
of transnational corporations, now used also in United Nations literature
on the subject. 2 This lack of distinction reflects partly a continuing
commitment to nondiscrimination among types of companies and inter-
national activities and partly a lack of recognition of the necessity to
pursue new directions in American foreign economic policy. The United
States Government still holds to post-World II assumptions underlying
its desired international economic order, and it continues to pursue policies
aimed at creating that particular order.
The rest of the world has walked away from that model, however,
whenever it adversely affected "vital interests." Even the United States has
asked for exceptions to the rules when applied to agriculture and altered
their application to several industrial sectors, transport services and
banking. And the developing countries are pressing strongly for the
creation of a new international economic order, whose rules they will help
set.3 Within this new order, the transnational corporation is also being
treated as an undesirable institution, requiring considerable restraint or
*B.S. 1943, Davidson College; M.A. 1945, University of North Carolina; M.A. 1950, Ph.D.
1952 (Economics), Princeton University. Professor of International Business, Graduate School
of Business Administration, University of North Carolina.
]"Mulfinational enterprise" as used here refers to that form of international business
which seeks to integrate activities of its affiliates and the headquarters company under a single
strategy formed at the center. It seeks to orient its marketing worldwide; to lock together
affiliates within its overall framework in the optimum arrangement for least-cost production;
and to coordinate managerial and technical strategies from the center. For distinctions from
other forms of international business, including the "classical investor" and the international
holding company, and for argument for the analytical utility of these distinctions, see J.
BEHRMAN, DECISION CRITERIA FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 1-34 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as DECISION CRITERIA]. An extensive bibliography* on international business
issues is to be found in Commission on Transnational Corporations (2d Sess.), Research on
Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/12 (1976), and Annexes, U.N. Doc.
E/C.10/12/Add. 1 (1976).
2See, e.g., Commission on Transnational Corporations (Ist Sess.), Areas of Concern
Which Could be Used as a Basis for Preliminary Work for a Code of Conduct to be Observed
by Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/L.2 (1975).
$During its Sixth Special Session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-
VI), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), and an accompanying
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even rejection. 4 Foreign direct investment may sometimes be desirable in
the new international economic order, admit its proponents, but not in the
forms in which investment has developed over the past ten or fifteen years'
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.
Res. 3202 (S-VI), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). The Declaration
states in part:
The new international economic order should be founded on full respect for the
following principles:
(c) Full and effective participation on the basis of equality of all countries in the
solving of world economic problems in the eommon interest of all countries, bearing
in mind the necessity to ensure the accelerated development of all the developing
countries, while devoting particular attention to the adoption of special measures in
favour of the least developed, land-locked and island developing countries as well
as those developing countries most seriously affected by economic crises and natural
calamities, without losing sight of the interests of other developing countries.
29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 4. The importance of less developed countries' participation is
stressed in J. BEHRMAN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1974).4The Programme of Action, supra note 3, calls for an "international code of conduct for
transnational corporations" to:
(a) Prevent interference in the internal affairs where they operate and their
collaboration with racist regimes and colonial administrations;
(b) Regulate their activities in host countries, to eliminate restrictive business
practices and to conform to the national development plans and objectives of
developing countries, and in this context facilitate, as necessary, review and revision
of previously concluded arrangements;
(c) Bring about assistance, transfer of technology and management skills to
developing countries on equitable and favourable terms;
(d) Regulate the repatriation of the profits accruing from their operations, taking
into account the legitimate interests of all parties concerned; [and]
(e) Promote reinvestment of their profits in developing countries.
29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 8. The form of international business most under attack has
been the resource-seeker, which I have called the "classical investor." See DECISION CRITERIA,
supra note 1. This form ties resources, both natural and labor, located in one country to other
stages of production in the home country or in third countries. Governments' increasing
concern to control their own destiny has caused takeovers of such extractive operations in
many countries. See, e.g., the takeover discussed in note 23 infra. The result has been a
significant shift in the methods of combining the contributions of transnational corporations
in this sector with the resources in host countries, altering the company organization and
operations. The result is not necessarily less international integration, but a shift in the locus
of control over the nature and extent of such integration.
Similarly, those international companies considered market-seekers, which I have called
"international holding companies," (IHC), see DECISION CRITERIA, supra note I, are being
pressed by many host governments to become localized in ownership and control. For
example, the Mexican foreign investment statute defines foreign investment to mean all direct
investments by foreign individuals, companies or other economic units without .juridical
personality; by Mexican-chartered entities with a majority of foreign capital; and by Mexican-
chartered entities in which foreigners exercise management responsibility regardless of the
nationality of ownership. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign
Investment of Feb. 16, 1973, D.O. (Mar. 9, 1973) [Mex.]. International holding companies
operate in fields such as banking, insurance, communications media, hotels and other services
primarily, but in the manufacturing sector as well. Where affiliates of IHC's are not integrated
across national boundaries, it is largely because of governmental restrictions on the movement
of goods, capital and personnel, or because of market differences which make it uneconomical
to integrate them. The lack of integration makes it easy for host governments to force joint
ventures or to constrain investor activities for the benefit of their national economies.
5Some of the reasons underlying this wariness are explored in Penrose, The State and'
Multinational Enterprises in Less-Developed Countries, in J. DUNNING, THE MULTINATIONAL
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The company seeking "least-cost production" in various countries to
serve a world market or at least one that is fairly standardized, i.e., a
"multinational enterprise" in my lexicon, 6 is a prime institution for
fostering international industrial integration. But these capabilities have
not been seen as a necessary or integral part of the economic relationships
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries or the Third World. Nor have these capabilities been seen as
uniquely useful in solving some of the problems of the "commons" which
are facing multiple members of the international community.7 What is
required to achieve international economic integration is a reorientation of
United States foreign economic policy so that the ME can play a significant
role in creating an acceptable interdependence leading away from the
present tendency toward anarchy.
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE POST-WORLD WAR II ECONOMIC ORDER
The United States Government sought even during the conduct of
World War II to plan for the postwar international order. The basic
underlying principle was that of multilateral, nondiscriminatory trade and
payments.8  This principle, based on the beliefs that international
economic welfare would be maximized by the removal of as many barriers
to trade and capital flows as possible, assumed that decisions taken under
free-market criteria would lead to an international division of labor, or
location of economic activity, which would be acceptable to all parties.
This acceptability would supposedly arise from the recognition that each
country would be receiving shares in the total product equivalent to its
contributions.
The postwar policies adopted by the United States Government
reflected its political objectives, the economic theory of the day and its
responses to the problems of the 1930's. As with much economic planning,
these policies were directed at solving the problems and eliminating the
disturbances of the 1930's, thereby enabling a "just endurable peace."
Assumptions related to political, economic and international priorities
underlay these policies.
International Economic Democracy
The postwar world was assumed to be directed properly toward a
concept of international democracy, under which one nation was equal to
ENTERPRISE 221 (1971), and in Behrman, Governmental Policy Alternatives and the Problem of
International Sharing, in id. at 289.
6 DECISION CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 6-17.
7For such an appreciation gap, see ASPEN INSTITUTE FOR HUMANISTIC STUDIES, THE
PLANETARY BARGAIN: PROPOSALS FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER TO MEET
HUMAN NEEDS 4-5 (1975).
8See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF WORLD
TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT (1945); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2756, PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (1947). But see W. DIEBOLD, THE END OF THE
I.T.O., 11-24 (1952) [hereinafter cited as DIEBOLD]. See generally Behrman, Political Factors
in U.S. International Financial Cooperation, 1945-1950, 47 AM. POLITICAL Sci. REV. 431
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Political Factors].
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another. International institutions reflected this principle, and inter-
national economic relations were built on the assumption that what was
sought was some concept of international economic welfare.9 Both the
political and economic policies of the postwar decade were abstracter from
economic size or dominance. All nations were to seek to be treated equally
and were to treat others equally in the political and economic arenas. This
objective included the further assumption that the world would accept the
principles of "rule by law," the rights of private property and the
principles of "free-market behavior." If disputes arose, they would be
submitted to international tribunals.
But developments of the last few decades have proven this assumption
false. Rather than forming an international economic democracy based on
the free market, the world has divided into a number of economic blocs:
Western Europe has its economic community; Eastern Europe, its COME-
CON; Latin America, the Free Trade Association and the Andean Pact;
Asia, the ASEAN Group; Africa, a number of groups. And the advanced
countries have formed the Oiganization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, which is counterpoised by the Group of 77, now including
over 100 developing countries.
The significance of these developments for United States foreign
economic policy is that no one set of rules will apply equally to all of the
different groups or to the national members, so there is continuous pressure
for renegotiation of the rules of trade and investment or their adaptation
for the interests of a particular group.1 0 Thus, the rules of trade and
investment among the advanced countries are not accepted in the Eastern
European countries nor by the developing countries. Further, the
developing countries have begun to assert their interests in a desire to
reform the rules; their objective is the creation of a new international
economic order which they have helped conceptualize and from which they
expect to obtain a more equitable distribution of the benefits of inter-
national economic growth."
International Economic Growth
The economic problems of the postwar world were to be solved by
sufficient increases in gross national products. Growth was not only
necessary to make the postwar adjustments easy, but it was assumed to be a
sufficient remedy for the economic ills of the world-at least, other objectives
could not be obtained except by the route of material advance.
For those of the developing countries which were not able to join as
full members of the world economy, their problem of inadequate produc-
9Political Factors, supra note 8, at 432-39.
1°Cf. W. FRIEDMANN & R. PUGH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 734-83 (1959).
"Note 3 supra. See also Behrman, Codes for Transnational Enterprises, in THE ETHICAL
BASIS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 125-58 (I. Hill ed. 1976); Behrman, Supranational Control of the
Multinational Enterprise, in INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 181-95 (D.
Wallace ed. 1974).
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tion would yield to infusions of capital. 12 Therefore, domestic capital
formation and international capital transfers would be a nearly adequate
solution to the problem of growth in the developing countries. With
growth properly stimulated, the "gap" existing after World War II between
the advanced and the poor countries would close within the foreseeable
future, thereby removing another obstacle to international democracy.
Within the industrialized countries, full employment was the prime
objective, and it was assumed that a balance of monetary and fiscal policies
would achieve this goal. It was further assumed that full employment
policies would not necessarily impose pressures on international payments
or interfere with the, obligations of the advanced countries to assist the less
developed countries in joining the international community. Full employ-
ment policies, therefore, would not themselves lead to disequilibria in
international payments. * Alternatively, if they did, nations would be
willing to make the adjustments necessary to prevent such disequilibria
and, therefore, would play their appropriate roles in generating maximum
international welfare for the community as a whole.
An underlying assumption shared by both advanced and developing
countries was that growth would be maximized so that nations would not
be concerned with the distribution of that growth among the member
states; whatever distribution occurred under free-market decisions of equal
bargaining members would be acceptable to all. Any distribution problems
left over would be handled by aid transfers. Such aid was justified as a
temporary phenomenon under which the benefits of the maximized
international economic welfare would be redistributed among the contri-
buting countries.
However, three new pressures have arisen which altered the setting
within which the formulation of this international economic policy took
place. First, concern has focused on the social costs of economic growth,
both domestic and international, including the desire to reduce or
eliminate damage to the national and international environments, both
from distrubances to cultural lifestyles and from the effects of industriali-
zation. A second pressure relates to the limits which may be reached in the
use of nonrenewable natural resources and to the power which those limits
furnish particular suppliers within the international economy. Here, of
course, one thinks of the energy shortage and the power of the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, though there are other possi-
bilities as we move towards scarcity in many other essential minerals or
metals. The third pressure arises from the concern for greater equity in
sharing of the benefits of international economic growth, which the less
developed countries (LDC's) feel needs not only to be corrected in the
future, but also to be adjusted to account for past inequities. To the
postwar United States, criterion of efficient use of world resources to
r-'se. e.g.. Thorp. the Necessily for Foreign Investment, 13 bEP'T STATE BULL. 829, 832
(19.15).
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maximize international economic welfare must therefore now be added that
of an equitable distribution of the benefits. This distribution is to be
counted not simply in the allocation of material gains, but also in the
allocation of effective participation in both decisionmaking and imple-
mentation.
The assumption of the United States concerning full employment and
the impact of domestic policies on the balance of payments of nations has
also proved invalid. The industrialized countries, including the United
States, have not maintained full employment. Yet, policy planners in the
late 1940's clearly understood that without the maintenance of full
employment in the United States, the postwar international economic
system would be jeopardized. Consequently, there has been manipulation
of elements in the balance of payments for national purposes, including
several such policy aberrations by the United States Government itself.'3
At the same time that national orientations have been reinforced by the
inability to maintain full employment, the increasing demands on govern-
ments for expansion of economic and social welfare programs have turned
government policies inward towards what is called the new nationalism.1 4
This form of nationalsim arises from demands for solutions to numerous
problems within the society which were formerly handled by individuals
or private economic units.1 5 Every increase in government responsibility
13Cf. Behrman, Foreign Private Investment and the Government's Efforts to Reduce the
Payments Deficit, 21 J. FINANCE 283 (1966). These efforts at obtaining voluntary investor
restraint were followed with constraint by regulation through the Depaitmnent of Commerce.
See Exec. Order No. 11,387. 3 C.F.R. 702 (1968). under which the Office of Foreign Direct
Investments promulgated regulations designed to improve the American balance of payments
position. See Behrman, Assessing the Foreign Investment Controls. 34 L. & CONTENIP. PROB.
84 (1969); Ellicott, United States Controls on Foreign Direct Inve.tment: The 1969 Program.
34 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 47 (1969); Soloman, Foreign Investment Controls: Policy and
Response, 34 L.. & CONTEMP. PROB. 118 (1969).
4T. GEIGER, IHE FORTUNES OF THE IVFST 49-53 (1973) Ihereinafter Citd s (;EIG:ERI.
15GEIGER. supra note 14. posits six categoiies of national policy objectives in the new
nationalism:
1. maintenance of economic growth and full employment, reqtuiring ade-
quate public and private capital formation, training of labor, and resealch and
development for technological innovalion.
2. continuing improvement of liing standards. including not only the
traditional component of rising material consumption but now also better health.
improved and continuous education. greater leisure and more facilities for recrea-
tional activities, and earlier and more secune and satisfying ietitement.
3. more equitable distribution of income, particuhlau ly to eliminate povet'tr
among the lowest income groups and to revitalie depressed and stagnant districts
and towns within the country.
4. consen'ation of natural and man-made environments. including utban
renewal and improvement, reduction and eventual elimination of air and water
pollution, etc.
5. advancement of knouledge, both basic and applied, especially medical
ieseatch, the exploration of space and of the oceans, and the development of
additional synthetic materials and new sources of enelgy.
6. safeguarding national security and meeting international re.ponsibihtie..
including defense expenditures, military research, arms assistanc- to allies and
friends, foreign-policy subsidies, development aid. (-c(.
Id. at 50.
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in the domestic economy increases the eagerness to reject or isolate dis-
turbances from the international economy.
International Trade and Investment
American postwar policy considered trade to be the primary problem of
the international economic arena and also the primary technique for
increasing world welfare. Movements of factors such as capital, tech-
nology, management and labor were considered unlikely, and, following
trade theory, they were not seen as a perfect substitute for trade. On the
other hand, trade was seen as a near substitute for factor movements in
equalizing the benefits of world economic growth. Therefore, freeing of
world trade was considered the paramount objective of international
economic policy. It was assumed that freer trade would be seen as a clear
benefit, both for the world as a whole and for individual nations. 16
Capital flows among nations were presumed to follow free-market
criteria, based on the returns to capital; only if left free would they
contribute appropriately to the maximization of international economic
welfare. But if capital flows destabilized the exchanges or forced countries
into unwanted disequilibria in payments, they would have to be controlled,
since trade was seen as a more significant contributor to economic growth.
When capital did not move so as to maximize world welfare, because of
political instability or "risk illusions," incentives could and should be used
to improve the situation by allocating capital more appropriately. There-
fore, private investment was relied upon in the development of a stable
world economy, but induced, where necessary, to respond appropriately
and supplemented strongly by government investment and grants.
It was further assumed that there are few, if any, connections between
trade and investment. Investment was considered to be drawn to various
locations by potential returns to capital, both long and short, for both
portfolio and direct investment. However, given the disturbances of the
1930's and 1940's, governments assumed that private capital would not flow
in sufficient amount. Therefore, governmental funds were substituted,
leading to the reorientation of the Export-Import Bank and the progressive
creation of the International Bank, the International Finance Corporation,
the International Development Authority, the Inter-American Development
Bank and eventually the Asian Bank. The necessity for any policy toward
private capital movements arose only from the need to prevent disequilibria
in balance of payments and to help private capital make a contribution to
the growth in developing countries. No long term policy was considered
necessary for investment among the industrialized countries (past the
Marshall Plan) because capital would "naturally" flow to the uses which
would maximize world welfare.
I"'Sel' t.S, I)1.PT OF STAT-, PUB. No. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF WORI.D TRADF
AND )VEI.OPMENT (1945).
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Therefore, the primary international economic objective was that of
liberating trade through reduction of tariffs and quantitative restrictions,
and supporting its expansion through stable exchange rates. The second
objective, adopted only in 1950, was that of accelerating growth in
developing countries; once this was achieved the liberalization of trade
would be even more significant and easy since the LDC's would be
included as full partners in an integrated international economy. The
international division of labor was determined by market criteria reflected
in development according to comparative advantages and trade patterns.
No special attention was given to locational factors for either industrial or
agricultural activities. But trade policies have been modified by advanced
countries towards protection for the purposes of maintaining existing
industrial and agricultural structures, or by developing countries to alter
comparative advantages so as to improve these opportunities for indus-
trialization.' 7  Both of these moves have raised the question of what
principle should be applied in the determination of the appropriate
international division of labor-that is, the allocation of economic activity
among countries. Classical theories, which underlie the postwar policies of
the United States, led to the conclusion that economic activity should be
located where comparative advantages existed. Development policies are
aimed, however, at changing those comparative advantages and at altering
the structure of industrial activity. Trade policies have therefore been
complemented by a variety of other policies aimed at deploying industry
around the world.
As a result of protectionist policies which required investment behind
high tariff barriers, both in the European economic community and in
developing countries, and the eagerness of American companies to main-
tain market positions, the flows of direct foreign investment and of
technology through licensing agreements created a new phenomenon of
"international production," complementing and substituting for the flow
of international trade and payments.,8
The decision factors surrounding international production are different
from those postulated by United States postwar policy as underlying
international economic relations. Rather than the flow of trade and
finance being independent, international production frequently ties these
two activities together. Domestic production in a foreign country has
arisen where trade would otherwise have taken place had barriers not been
erected, and trade was created as a result of the new locations of production
and shifting comparative advantages. In addition, other trade oppor-
tunities were opened as the result of the investment in complementary
goods or capital equipment as well as in technology. Trade and
l"Protectionist considerations underlay much of the business community's opposition to
the proposed International Trade Organization. See DIEBOLD, note 8 supra, at 20-24.
18Behrman, Promoting Free World Economic Development Through Direct Investment.
50 AM. ECON. REv. (No. 2, Papers & Proceedings) 271, 273-77 (1960).
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investment, therefore, have become integrally tied through a new institu-
tion, the Transnational Corporation (TNC).' 9
THE TREND TOWARD NEOMERCANTILISM
In the early postwar years, the United States was the dominant
economic power in the world, supplying the necessary capital and setting
the rules of the game. Its views had prevailed not only in the establishment
of the International Monetary Fund, but also in that of the World Bank
and even in the Charter of the International Trade Organization, which
was aborted by Congress because of the inclusion of some provisions on
direct investment, restrictive business practices and full employment
obligations that it did not like.20 It was not possible for the world to go in
any direction unacceptable to the United States. The situation has changed
substantially, but the American policy stance has appeared to be one of a
rear guard action to prevent other nations from moving in a different
direction. Despite these efforts, the demands for new orientations have
increased significantly in each of the aspects noted in the section above and
in other ways as well.
2
'
These changes in the international economy raise the question of the
direction in which we are moving. No longer are we clearly seeking to
form an integrated international economy; rather, there are disintegrating
forces pulling in the direction of neomercantilism. This movement is
exemplified by the cries of the developing countries against "dependencia"
and their seeking for a higher degree of national self-sufficiency and
independence, "de-linking" from the advanced countries. At the same
time, there is a widespread recognition in the developing countries, as well
as members of the OECD, that the world is highly interdependent and that
a continued flow of foreign direct investment is necessary to achieve
national objectives.
Still, neomercantilism shows in the gradual takeover of international
companies in the extractive sector, petroleum and mining, and the gradual
localization of companies in the service sectors.2 2 These service organi-
zations, such as hotels, insurance companies, media, advertising, retailing
"9The transnational corporation's decisions on investment and location of production
are made on the basis of advantage to the company rather than comparative advantage among
countries. See Behrman, International Sectoral Integration: An Alternative Approach to Freer
Trade, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 269, 270 (1972). Eric Wyndam White, former Secretary-General
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, proposed negotiations on trade barriers based
on a more manageable sector-by-sector approach and, since trade has increasingly become a
result of foreign investment and of the shifts in the international location of production, the
sectoral approach would have to encompass modem investment patterns; several such sectoral
agreements have already been implemented. See, e.g., C. BEIGiE, THE CANADA-U.S.
AUTOMOTIVE AGREEMENT: AN EVALUATION (1970); Pella, The Coal and Steel Communtiy as a
Case Study in Integration, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 137, 146 (C. Haines ed. 1957).
2
oSee DIEBOLD, supra note 8, at 11-24.
21See J. BEHRMAN, TOWARD A NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1974).
22For a record showing a pattern of increased annual takeovers, see Hawkins, Mintz &
Provisciero, Government Takeovers, 7 J. INT'L BUS. STUDIEs 3-16 (1976).
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and management consultants, are not companies which are highly inte-
grated; they normally both obtain resources and sell outputs entirely within
the host country. Where nations feel themselves able to dispense with the
services of the international companies, they are gradually doing so, either
by buying them out or literally confiscating them. 23 Outright confiscation
has diminished, as compared with pressure to divest 24 because of a desire to
maintain a climate favorable to further investment desired in other sectors)
As a result of these policies, which gradually reduce international
investment in the extractive and service sectors, the presence of foreign-
owned companies is relatively narrowed to manufacturing activities.
Within the manufacturing sector, there are two types of companies still
active-the international holding company (IHC) and the multinational
enterprise (ME).
The IHC form is not integrated in the same way as the ME form, since
its objective is largely to seek production within the host country for the
purpose of serving the national market.25 It the total operation of the
21One of the most extensively discussed such takeovers has been the 1971 expropriation
of foreign copper enterprises in Chile. This confiscation culminated a long and turbulent
investor-host nation relationship. See Mikesell, Conflict in Acommodation in Chilean
Copper, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINERAl. INDUSTRIES 369 (R. Mikesell
ed. 1971). The case presents many of the problems inhering in foreign direct investment and
exemplifies the clash in objectives of investor and host government which can lead to the
deterioration and ultimate abrogation of the relationship.
In the Chilean case, the antagonism became so great that under the expropriatory
legislation, then President Allende was empowered "to order the Comptroller General, in
computing the compensation, to deduct all or part of the excess profits earned annually by the
nationalized companies .... " Law No. 17,450 of July 15, 1971, reprinted in translation in 10
INT'L L. MATERIALS 1067, 1069 (1971). This provision not only led to no compensation for the
expropriation of assets having a book value estimated at well over $300 million, but also to an
assertion that the investor (Kennecott) owed restitution of excess profits in the amount of some
$310 million. The dispute was defused following the 1973 military coup d'etat overthrowing
Allende, and the junta reached a settlement with Kennecott in 1974. See generally T. MORAN,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS oF'DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE (1974);
Note, The Chileanization of the Copper Industry, I N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 158 (1969).
The problem of protecting against such a risk is an old one in international business,
and various methods have been employed to seek to provide security. See Fatouros, Legal
Security for International Investment, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 699 (W.
Friedmann-& R. Pugh eds. 1959); Fatouros, The Quest for Legal Security of Foreign
Investments, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 257 (1963). The Act of State doctrine has thwarted American
investors who have sought to recover compensation by proceeding against assets located in the
United States belonging to nationals of the expropriating country, even though compensation
was owed under traditional principles of international law. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). but see First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759 (1972). See generally Delson, The Act of State Doctrine: Judicial Deference or
Abstention, 66 AM. J. INT'L. L. 82 (1972); Fleming, The Nationalization of Chile's Large
Copper Companies in Contemporary Interstate Relations, 18 VILL. L. REv. 593 (1973); Vicuna,
Some International Law Problems Posed by the Nationalization of the Copper Industry by
Chile, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 711 (1973).
24See Behrman, International Divestment: Panacea of Pitfall? 18 LOOKING AHEAD 1
(1970). It has been suggested that forced divestiture of foreign-owned affiliates is the solution
to the conflict between private direct investment and the policies of the developing countries.
See, e.g., A. HIRSCHMAN, HOW TO DIVEST IN LATIN AMERICA, AND WHY (1969).21The IHC affiliate in the host country thus appears as a nationally-owned company,
and this type of investment presents the fewest problems for the host government because the
[Vol. 52:601
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company were nationally based, such foreign direct investment would have
the disintegrating effect on the international economy of a total substitute
for trade through the movement of the factors of capital, management and
technology. The IHC form has been most predominant in the developing
countries simply because their markets have not been open to all exports
and imports. Not being integrated across national borders, the developing
countries feel that they can interfere with foreign investment without losing
significant benefits. There is less necessity to take into account inter-
national competitive conditions, and therefore less restraint on the govern-
ments, in imposing various kinds of regulations or interferences.
One of the problems facing the ME form is that little distinction in
policy circles has been made between it and the IHC form. Therefore, the
potential role of the ME form has been more circumscribed than appro-
priate if governments have an objective of international industrial inte-
gration and it is to be achieved in the most effective manner.2 6
THE ME IN THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
Although international companies have existed previously, such as in
the extractive sector, which had tied production and trade tightly together,
international production became a significant phenomenon only in the
1960's with the rapid expansion of direct investment and the rise of the
multinational enterprise.27 The multinational enterprise was a new form
which tied the economies within which it operated even more tightly
together. Its essential characteristic is the integration of its affiliates with
each other and with the parent under a centralized policy dictated from
headquarters. It has unique capabilities compared with other forms of
international business, and therefore calls for a different policy orientation.
It could not operate effectively to achieve the goals of economic inter-
nationalism sought in postwar United States policies; its very existence
undercuts historical United States objectives.
The particular characteristics which make up the multinational
enterprise developed among fairly open national economies.2 8 Once the
affiliate is local market oriented and is managerially independent from outside control; thus,
centralized policy control is not emphasized, and there is less chance of conflict with national
interests. See Behrman, The Multinational Enterprise: Its Initiatives and Governmental
Reactions, 6 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 215, 216-17 (1972).
2"-See Ball. Toward a World Economy, DuN'S REVIEw, February, 1968, at 19; Ball, The
Promise of the Multinational Corporation, FORTUNE, June 1, 1967, at 80; Behrman, The
Multinational Enterprise: Its Initiatives and Governmental Reactions, 6 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
215. 222-24 (1972); Behrman, Sharing International Production Through the Multinational
Enterprise and Sectoral Integration, 4 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1, 1-36 (1972); Fayerweather, The
Internationalization of Business, 403 ANNALS 1 (1972); Krause, The International Economic
System and the Multinational Corporation, 403 ANNALS 93 (1972); Nye, Multinational
Enterprise.s and Prospects for Regional and Global Political Integration, 403 ANNALS 116
(1972).
2 7Behrman, Promoting Free World Economic Development .through Direct Investment,
51 Ai. Econ. REv. (No. 2, Papers & Proceedings) 271, 273-77 (1960).2
'This point is more fully discussed in J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE
ML'I.TINATIONAIL ENTERPRISE 1-12 (1970).
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barriers to the movement of goods were reduced among the OECD
countries through negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT); once the enlargement of the European market occurred
through the formation of the European Community; once currencies were
secure enough to attract capital movements; once governments were stable
enough to reduce political risks, the large United States corporations, and
more lately those of Europe and Japan, extended their multiproduct
organization into other regions of the world.29 This created a multi-
product, multiregion enterprise, integrating production and marketing
activities so as to achieve least-cost operations among the advanced
countries. In addition, some foreign sourcing occurred in developing
countries which provided low labor costs and relatively high labor
productivity so that their activities could also be integrated with those of
the other affiliates or headquarters of the multinational enterprises.
Consequently, a form of international industrial integration has arisen
without its having been conceived within the policy planning of govern-
ments.
This integration did not occur without raising some concerns on the
part of host governments, however. Japan early restricted the freedom of
entry of such companies in order to reduce the degree of foreign ownership
and control over Japanese industry.30 Although Canada and Europe did
not act similarly, they became concerned over the extent of foreign
ownership, especially in specific industrial sectors, and over the possible
disruption of national policies, including those related to economic
growth, employment, monetary stability, balance-of-payments equilibria,
technological advance and income policies. 31
In a partial response to these concerns, various governments and
regional groups have promulgated codes of conduct directed at the
international companies.3 2 These codes have not distinguished between the
29For instance, in Canada the percentage of direct foreign financing in gross capital
formation rose from 19 percent to 33 percent and the proportion in new capital formation
from 24 percent to 43 percent between 1946 and 1965. See PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE REPORT,
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY 424 (1968). In the United
Kingdom, during the mid-1960's, United States affiliates' expenditures on plant and
equipment amounted to between 2 percent and 15 percent of annual national capital
expenditures in manufacturing. For all Common Market countries, the United States portion
of industrial investment rose from 4.5 percent in 1958 to 6.3 percent in 1964. See generally J.
BEHRMAN, SOME PAT-ERNS IN THE RISE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 42-43 (1969).3
°See D, HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 3-35 (1973).
3 1See The Impact of Multinational Corporations on the Development Process and on
International Relations, U.N. ESCOR Res. 1721 (LIII), 53 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. 1, at 3, U.N.
Doc. E/5209 (1972); Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc.
ST/ECA/190 (1974); Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, The Impact of Multinational
Corporations on Development and on International Relations, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/6 (1974).
See also Behrman, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Interests, and National
Sovereignty, 4 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 15 (1969).
32See Commission on Transnational Corporations (2d Sess.), National Legislation and
Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/8 (1976), and
Annexes, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/8/Add. 1 (1976); Commission on Transnational Corporations (2d
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IHC or ME forms of operation, treating all types similary, despite the fact
that the results of the restrictions are not the same for each type.
Consequently, governments are achieving results from controls which they
did not necessarily seek.
Both the IHC and ME forms exist among the advanced countries,
though the IHC form predominates within the developing countries.
Recently, however, the opening of trade opportunities, as well as the
movement of capital, among the developing countries or between them and
some of the advanced countries is introducing the possibility of ME type
activities among affiliates within developing countries as well as between
them and the advanced countries. The codes of conduct previously aimed
at the IHC type are likely to affect adversely these nascent ME type
activities.
Fortunately, for the purpose of keeping policy options open in the
future, the OECD Guidelines for Transnational Corporations33 are not so
stringent that they will adversely affect one form of business organization
or the other. So far, the major impacts of the Guidelines will be to obtain
the disclosure of information, which itself should reinforce an under-
standing of the necessity to make distinctions among the impacts of the
various company forms for the purposes of achieving a greater inter-
dependence or national independence, whichever is desired.
Both the OECD code and the two sets of proposed United Nations
codes, one by the advanced countries (Group B)S4 and the other by the
Group of 77,35 contain a mixture of policy orientations; they submit to the
nationalistic pressures of the day while at the same time requiring the
companies to operate as though they were within an international
competitive system.36 These differences reflect the fact that the nations of
the world cannot agree 'n what type of international economy they want.
They are consequently taking both stands, which will lead to further
frustration so long as they do not recognize that the IHC form supports a
high degree of national self-sufficiency while the ME form supports a
greater degree of interdependence and specialization. Most of the code
provisions move the companies in the direction of the IHC form,
exemplified at the extreme by the provisions requiring "fade-out" and joint
Sess.). International Codes and Regional Agreements Relating to Transnational Corporations,
U.N. Doc. E/C.10/9 (1976) and Annexes, U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/9/Add. 1 (1976); INT'L CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (1972); D. WALLACE, INTER-
NATIONAL CONTROL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1974).
"
3These guidelines have been published as an Annex to the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development's Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises, OECD PRESS/A(76)20 (June 21, 1976).
"
1See Commission on Transnational Corporations (2d Sess.), REPORT, 61 U.N. ESCOR,
Supp. 5, at 23-25, U.N. Doc. E/5782 (1976).
'-%See id. at 21-22. For a discussion of the work being done, together with a useful
compilation of references to relevant documents, see Rubin, Reflections Concerning the
United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 73 (1976).
I6See Transnational Corporations: Issues Involved in the Formulation of a Code of
Condtct. 1'.N. Doc. E, C. 1( 17 (1976).
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ventures. The increasing participation of government companies as join
venture partners is also likely to reduce significantly the integrating
operations of the ME form, pushing it back toward the IHC form.
If the present trends in the international economy continue, it is likely
that the ME type will gradually disappear or at least stagnate at the present
level. Future foreign direct investment will be oriented toward national
economies with an effort to push vertical or horizontal integration within
the national economy, rather than across national boundaries, which will
push companies into the IHC form. Consequently, international speciali-
zation will be reduced, and the more effective use of world resources
dampened. No judgment is made here as to whether or not this is
desirable; that depends on the value judgments underlying the policy
approaches of the various governments. All that is asserted here is that
present policy orientations do not take into account the feasibility of using
different kinds of companies for different policy objectives but rather treat
all of them in the same manner and, therefore, produce results which were
not necessarily anticipated or desired.
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (NIEO)
If a new international economic order emerges, it will do so out of
three present and distinct pressures: those moving towards nationalism
and economic independence, those strengthening internationalism and
economic interdependence, and those arising from special problems which
require distinct institutional arrangements, such as environmental protec-
tion and the development of ocean resources.
Independence
Evidence exists in the actions of both the international companies and
host governments that the role of foreign direct investment may be
diminishing on the international scene. National governments have
imposed increasingly stringent regulations on entry and operations, and
they have called for regional and international regulations which are likely
to make opportunities abroad less attractive than those at home for
companies in most of the advanced countries. From the standpoint of
company decisions, the adverse impact of these restrictions is reinforced by
the increased demand in the advanced countries for capital investment and
new technological breakthroughs. In addition, the instabilities in the
international economy, resulting from the cyclical activities in major
economies, have raised the economic risks at a time when political risks are
also high. Governments, therefore, appear to be placing obstacles in the
way of foreign direct investment at a time when interest in such activities
on the part of companies may be waning. If, in fact, foreign direct
investment is needed to accelerate growth in the developing countries, the
new international economic order will need to provide stimuli, not
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necessarily incentives, for the companies simply to assess opportunities that
may exist.
Instead, from initiatives taken by the Group of 77 and its individual
members, it would appear that increased governmental interference is
likely, even to the point of government participation in many of the
manufacturing activities of the international companies. 37 Such partici-
pation would have as its objective the control of company activities in the
host country based on ex ante information, rather than ex post disclosure
which would require the governments ot try to undo what was already
done. Inadequate responses by the companies to requests for information
disclosure currently are likely to bring on a higher degree of governmental
participation in ownership and control. 38 The result will be to force the
international companies to dissociate their affiliates so that their activities
can be contained within national markets. The consequence will be
international industrial disintegration with a reduction of trade, despite the
fact that developing countries are greatly interested in an expansion of
exports. 39
Interdependence
Few of the developed countries are seeking to reduce the interde-
pendence which exists in the international economy, and most of the
developing countries recognize that a high degree of interdependence will
be necessary to achieve satisfactory levels of economic and social welfare.
However, for a time, they feel the necessity to step back from "depen-
dencia" and to establish a sufficient degree of independence so that they
may then renegotiate the nature and extent of interdependence. Inter-
dependence, to the developing countries, means mutual dependence, as is
the case within Europe. Whatever degree of interdependence is achieved,
they want the benefits distributed more equitably. If interdependence is
achieved under the decisions of the transnational corporations, LDC's see
37See, e.g., Letter from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations
(Nov. 22, 1973), U.N. Doc. A/9330, at 96-99 (1973); Letter from the Permanent Representative
of Peru to the United Nations (Sept. 1, 1975), U.N. Doc. A/10217, at 44-57 (1975).
3See J. BEHRMAN, DEMAND FOR INFORMATION FROM MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 16-17
(1976) [on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
39The desire of the developing countries for exports from affiliates of the transnational
corporation is evidenced in a report by the UNCTAD Secretariat which emphasizes the
desirability of requiring TNC's to expand their exports, increase local processing of materials
and raise the value of exports to other countries, while not increasing imports or import
prices. Role of Transnational Corporations in the Trade in Manufactures and Semimanu-
factures of Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/185/Supp. 2 (1976).
There is no -recognition in this report that the ME's can produce a high degree of
industrial integration. Rather it reflects a request that each developing country seek, through
the operations of the TNC's, to expand its exports. This desire reflects a concern for the
location of industrial activity within the country, an increase in the value added by such
activities and an expansion of the market served through exports. Of course, not everyone
cI achieve this goal, and a critical question will arise as to what specific industries are
located in what countries. A type of interdependence would arise, without there having been
any serious consideration of what type was desirable.
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the benefits going more to the TNC's than to themselves. Latin America
has long asserted that it will not achieve economic integration for the
benefit of the international companies. 0
The developing countries thus want a better position in the new order
and expect the advanced countries to help them achieve it. At the same
time, they are likely to make it more difficult for foreign direct investment
to take place. The conditions which would encourage the growth of
foreign direct investment are numerous, but they are not all likely to exist
in the near future. They include relative economic and political stability
and expansion of markets overseas, the absence of adverse interferences
from political authorities, continued successes from past foreign invest-
ment, reduction in barriers to trade and capital movements including a
decrease in transport and communication costs, the development of new
technologies, the discovery of new natural resources, continued disparities
in labor costs abroad relative to productivity, increasing standardization
among world markets, continued importance of economies of scale in
reducing costs of production and in serving worldwide markets, continued
interest in defensive investment to maintain market share, and continued
availability of surplus management and capital.
Not all of these conditions will continue to exist, but the international
companies will adjust to changed rules so long as they are the same for all
participants and an opportunity remains for successful operations. From
the standpoint of molding the new international economy, however, the
mere existence of these conditions and expansion of TNC activities is not
enough. Under conditions in which the TNC's determine the location of
industrial activity and the structure of trade, these companies would create
the new international economic order. This is unacceptable both to
advanced and developing countries. Consequently, what is required is a
determination of the type of order that is desired and then the role which
the TNC's, but especially the ME's, can play in it.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND THE ME's ROLE IN THE NIEO
The ME is probably the most useful institution for achieving the very
integration that is desired among both the advanced and the developing
countries, as well as between them. 41 To recognize this does not reduce the
4
"The members of LAFTA have signed and put into operation nine sectoral agreements
that reduce duties or allocate production, or both, among the parties to the agreement. Another
nine have been signed but are not yet in operation, and another sixteeen are under
negotiation. See generally Note, The Latin American Free Trade Association-An Attempt at
Economic Integration, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 297. The most successful agreement was
Agreement No. 1 (1962), however, no subsequent agreement has permitted a single company
to gain such benefits and none is likely. See J. BEHRMAN, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMIANIES IN LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION (1972).
4 For instance, because the multinational enterprise has affiliates in many countries, it is
particularly capable of meeting governmental demands for sharing the benefits of large
intergovernmental projects such as the NATO projects for co-production of weapons systems.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8593, MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION CONSORTIA: LESSONS FROM
NATO EXPERIENCE (1971). The multinational enterprise can be used as a vehicle for
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necessity to achieve a better distribution of the benefits and a reorientation
of the loyalties within the TNC's. For example, the Chairman of the
Economic Council of Canada sees the NIEO as demanding
international support in persuading multinational firms to adapt their
technology and overall activities to the needs and interests of host
countries, and backing for moves to change patent laws and other
measures in ways that will lower the costs of transferring technology to
underdeveloped countries; [and] elimination of traditional legal restraints
on expropriation of foreign investments without full and immediate
compensation. 2
There are special roles for the ME form, and it can be used in a way to
distribute the benefits of international growth more appropriately. For
example, the negotiations on the Law of the Sea and the development of
oceanic resources is part and parcel of the development of the new
international economic order. The significance of these negotiations is
emphasized by the fact that this is the first large scale negotiation
concerning the rules of the game in which the developing countries have
had a primary role to play. All prior negotiations have been an effort to
modify past rules while here, the rules are being developed de novo, and the
developing countries are being very careful that they reflect their interests
adequately. Of course, these negotiations affect a variety of interests such
as security, science and technology, environment, food, energy, resource
management, communications, international trade and the construction of
new institutions to implement the rules.
The role of the ME's in development of oceanic resources could be
critical, but it will have to be adapted to the new needs and pressures; the
ME cannot simply be flung into the exploitation of the sea without the
guidance of all interested governments. This calls for the kind of
imaginative new arrangements which will reflect all of the interests and
demonstrate that they can be met equitably. ME's of several countries
could be drawn into consortia for the purpose of exploration and
development, permitting participation of many countries in various phases
of the operations. To be effective, obviously, new rules will also have to
provide for an adequate level of efficiency in the operation of these
consortia, or their special capabilities will be eliminated. These consortia
could operate in conjunction with or separately from the proposed
International Enterprise for exploration and development. 4
Since the ME's originate largely in the United States, although
increasingly in Europe and in Japan, it is incumbent upon the United
accomplishing an acceptable division of industrial production while reducing the costs of
sacrificing efficiency in order to gain participation among the developing countries. See
Behrman, Sharing International Production Through the Multinational Enterprise and
Sectoral Integration, 4 L. & Pob. INT'L Bus. 1, 1-36 (1972).42
"Thoughts on the New International Economic Order," Address by Andre Raynauld,
Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois, (Feb. 24, 1976) at 6-7.43See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8593, MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION CONSORTIA:
LESSONS FROM NATO EXPERIENCE (1971).
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States Government to take the initiative necessary to demonstrate the
potential role of the ME's within the NIEO. It can do this by
demonstrating the tradeoffs which are necessary in meeting the multiple
goals sought by the developing and advanced countries in any such new
order. These goals will require a tradeoff of efficiency for greater
participation among all countries, but that is the nature of governmentally
based decisions. Democratic governments have as a major objective the
participation of its citizens in the decisionmaking processes; carried to the
international level, acceptance of the NIEO will require similar widespread
participation. Efficiency is a prime objective of business and widespread
participation in decisionmaking can reduce efficiency in the pure input-
output sense; without it, however, implementation may be much less
effective and the results are also likely to be much less acceptable.
Therefore, taking a wider view of the efficiency criteria, participation is a
necessary part of both the inputs and outputs. Otherwise neither the
process of the inputs nor the distribution of the outputs will be deemed
equitable.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND PRESENT UNITED STATES FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY
In its policy formation, the United States Government has not
recognized the existence or usefulness of different forms of international
companies. The studies of the Departments of Commerce and Treasury on
the subject of multinational corporations and the representations of the
State Department at international bodies have failed to recognize the
special capabilities of the ME's in supporting international industrial
integration." In fact, United States policymakers are in principle opposed
to recognizing distinctions among types of companies because they
maintain a basic policy of nondiscrimination among types of business and
among regions. Of course, other policies do involve such discrimination,
as evidenced by the differing treatments of the petroleum companies and
those businesses dealing with Eastern Europe, Russia, Cuba and China.
In line with its policy of nondiscrimination, the United States
Government has formulated policies toward the international companies
based on functional activities rather than on the results of overall
operations in support of major policy objectives such as international
integration. These separate functional policies are themselves formulated
and implemented by different agencies within the United States Govern-
ment, and there remains an absence of coordination among them.4 5 There
"The inability of the United States Government to see distinctions among the types of
international companies is reflected in testimony before Congress and in governmental
reports. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Policy Aspects of Foreign Investment by U.S.
Multinational Corporations, 7-17, in 1 THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: STUDIES ON U.S.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1 (1972).
45Antitrust regulations are extended abroad to prevent their frustration at home.
Taxation is imosed to assure equity between the treatments of foreign and domestic
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are policies toward antitrust violations by any of the international
companies which do not take adequately into account the different forms
or relationships among companies overseas. During the regime of capital
controls, no distinctions were drawn among the types of companies,
though distinctions were applied among different categories of countries
depending on their degree of development. Controls over the exports of
goods and technology have been applied without reference to the types of
companies involved or their effects on the integration of the United States
economy with that of the rest of the world. The Treasury formulates tax
policy, along with Congress, without regard to the impacts on different
types of companies and their contribution to the United States balance of
payments or international integration.
One overall policy of the United States Government toward foreign
direct investment involved its role in accelerating economic growth in the
developing countries. This policy began essentially in the early 1950's after
the Point Four program under President Truman. Its primary orientation
was to help remove obstacles to private investment in the developing
countries, and considerable emphasis was given to the role of the private
sector in the Alliance for Progress under the Kennedy Administration in the
early 1960's. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's private foreign investment
was relied upon to provide a stimulus to development especially in the
industrial sectors of Latin America, Africa and Asia, and United States
policy placed emphasis, within the lending programs of the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank as well as the International
Finance Corporation, on stimulating the flow of private direct invest-
ment.4 6 Congress itself stressed in many of the aid bills that priority should
be given to the development of the private sector. However, Congress was
especially cautious not to stimulate industrial activities in the developing
countries which would be competitive with United States industry,
especially in its domestic markets. Therefore, foreign direct investment was
seen as a means of assisting the foreign countries within their own
economies but not as a means of integrating the international economy.4 7
These policies were also implemented out of a separate agency, ill-
coordinated with the others.
opportunities. Reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission on foreign affiliates is
regulated to satisfy domestic investors. Exports of technology and goods are controlled to
prevent "enemy" countries from obtaining them through foreign affiliates. The flow of funds
to and from affiliates is regulated to minimize adverse effects on the United States balance of
payments. See J. BEHRMAN, CONFLICTING CONSTRAINTS ON THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 8-
22 (1974).
4 See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 20,226-27 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Bingham regarding the
Inter-American Development Bank).
47Despite the institution of a government program of investment guarantees in 1948.
private United States direct outlays averaged only $700 million a year during 1947-1955,
mostly to Canada and Latin America. In 1956 and 1957 the outflow was $2 billion and $2.5
billion respectively. By the early 1960's, however, the government began to change its signals:
the business community was in effect told to adopt two poses-to concentrate its investment in
the developing nations and restrain itself in the industrialized countries. See Behrman,
Foreign Investment Muddle: The Perils of Ad Hoccery, I COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 51 (1965).
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In the reverse direction, United States policy is to maintain an open
economy, receiving investment from other countries in virtually any sector.
Excepting coastwide shipping, media, banking and manufacturing of
products for the defense establishment, virtually any foreign company can
invest directly in any activity that is legal for United States citizens. The
basic principle which the United States Government has adopted is that of
noninterference in foreign investment decisions except where they contra-
vene United States law as applied to United States citizens, and therefore it
extends national treatment to foreign investors. The United States would
like to have the same principle applied by other countries, and it has
achieved agreement within the OECD that this should be the case for
national policies of the members. Another part of the OECD Guidelines
on which the United States Government insisted includes a restriction on
the incentives and disincentives to be applied by governments, so as to
prevent a warping of investment decisions away from the structure dictated
by free-market criteria.
Basically, the posture of the United States Government toward foreign
direct investment in the past several years has been defensive, in the sense of
trying to prevent encroachments by governments on the ability of cor-
porations to invest where they wish and to operate as they like. Although
the United States accepts the right of other governments to put constraints
on entry and operations of foreign companies, it accepts this in principle
only when it is in line with similar constraints on domestically owned
companies, and it rejects the use of incentives to warp the decisions of
companies.
There has thus been no effort to stimulate one kind of foreign
investment over another despite the fact that the different types produce
quite different results as to the future nature of the international economy.
Given the fact that it has no positive stance towards promotion of any
particular form of private investment in any one area of the world, the
United States Government is presently reduced to holding what it can in
preventing further encroachments on the activities of private companies
around the world; this gives it a stance essentially of noncooperation when
other governments feel they have problems with the way in which the
companies are operating or expanding. The United States' posture is,
therefore, not fully appreciated by other governments and appears to be
increasingly out of phase with the mounting pressures for a new inter-
national economic order. The United States Government should take
initiatives in helping the rest of the world make the necessary assessments
and tradeoffs so as to use the capabilities of the ME's effectively. To date it
has not taken such a stance, and it will probably require some reorientation-
of priorities and reorganization of foreign policy formulation to make such
a shift.
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REDIRECTION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
In order to redirect United States foreign economic policy toward the
utilization of the ME's special capabilities, several changes will be required.
The first is the placing of the highest priority on achieving international
economic integration by rules associated with the creation of the NIEO,
rather than the continued effort to impose the post-World War II
principles. The second change would be toward a recognition that the
most important issue will be the nature of the international division of
labor, as exemplified by the location of industrial activities rather than the
pattern of trade. And the third major shift will be toward an effective
cooperation between business and government in assessing the necessary
tradeoffs and in determining the means by which the ME's can be most
effectively used.
Integration
Unless there is a concerted effort on the part of major countries, the
world will continue to move predominantly toward economic disinte-
gration or national self-sufficiency. The pressures- for doing so are intense,
and the obstacles to a cooperative system are large. The price of continued
disintegration is likely to be conflict, which will be more difficult to resolve
than the problems of cooperation.
The rewards of cooperation will be a more effective use of resources,
resulting from specialization that reflects an agreed interdependence.
Obviously, integration will not lead to pure specialization on the part of
any of the national participants, since most of the needs of the peoples of
the world have to be met locally. But a cooperative system would permit
specialization without a feeling of dependence. It is only within such a
setting that the special capabilities of the ME can be utilized most
effectively.4 8 It would encourage specialization among the affiliates of the
enterprise while at the same time distributing the benefits equitably. In
addition, the diversity of ME's, and competition among them, would locate
parts of each industrial sector around the world, and governmental
guidance would achieve an acceptable distribution of industrial activity.
Industrial Policies
In order to use the ME's, the United States Government will need to
recognize that the prior emphasis on trade and payments as against
investment will have to be reversed. In a world of expanding foreign
investment, trade will follow investment rather than industrial location
following the forces determining the pattern of trade. It is fairly clear now
that many of the industries can be located in many different countries and be
effective in serving both local and international markets. This is especially
'This point is more fully developed in J. BEHRMAN & H. WALLENDER, TRANSFER OF
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY WITHIN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1976).
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true under ologopolistic structures where many of the purchases and sales
are intracompany rather than on a "free market."
Consequently, governments have come to recognize that the primary
question is how to attract and build up an industrial base, poles of
development, out of which trade can be developed and foreign exchange
earned. These developmental poles also attract secondary and tertiary
industry and therefore additional investment, both domestic and foreign.
Once governments set their minds to determine the best ways of distri-
buting industrial activities around the world, and yet keep these principles
open and flexible enough to permit creativity and innovation, we can
expect to find concerns over trade patterns falling into secondary or tertiary
positions in foreign economic policies.49 Similarly, it is likely to become
easier to obtain agreement on international monetary questions and the
stability of foreign exchanges, since the basic equity of the international
system will already be determined. Without such a determination, the
concern for equity gets shunted into mechanisms such as the international
monetary system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, where
countries evidence their concern over the symptoms of inequities, rather
than over the realities.
Focusing on the underlying problem of the location of industrial
activity and the international division of labor will relieve the need to
impose a variety of interferences, such as quantitative restrictions, so as to
warp the patterns of trade to protect or stimulate specific industrial sectors.
Similarly, the advanced countries should be more willing and able to adjust
their own industrial patterns so as to permit entrance of the developing
countries into specific industrial sectors such as textiles, automobiles,
electronics, chemicals and mineral processing.
Once this second shift is made, with the United States taking a positive
initiative to recognize the underlying problems of the location of industrial
activity and opening an appropriate dialogue, the adversary posture of
many of the countries of the world should diminish. A more forthcoming
and cooperative attitude is likely to grow in its place. The initiative
remains with the United States, however, given its role as the source of
much direct investment and technology.
Business-Government Coordination
Even the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Secretariat recognizes that a cooperative international system
can be effectively developed only if it embodies "complementary action
both by governments and enterprises." 50 Efforts by governments to dictate
what the ME's do will always be limited by the ability of the enterprise to
49See Behrman, Sharing International Production Through the Multinational Enterpri.se
and Sectoral Integration, 4 L. & Poi.icv INT'l. Bus. 1, 28-30 (1972).
'uRole of Ti ansnational Co ipo.al i il ihe 'lfid. ill Maniumlu',, and Seni
manufactures of Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD 185 Supp. 2, at 20 (1976).
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opt for less constrained activities and locations. Thus, if international
operations are highly restricted, the ME's may simply revert to primarily
domestically-oriented operations. Only a cooperative determination of
what is feasible and attractive to the enterprises is likely to prevent such
frustration. Their dedication and efficiency is to be desired, even though
final control may rest with the governments. It will be desirable, therefore,
to have continuous consultation between governments and the enterprises,
setting the rules under which the latter will operate in pursuit of
governmental goals.Presently, there is an inadequate structure within the United States
Government for acquisition of industry views on alternative policies and
approaches. 51 The Department of Commerce is inadequately structured,
oriented and respected; State Department officials at several levels have
retained a suspicion of the motives and operations of the international
companies; Treasury's role cannot elicit the greatest candor from the
companies, and many AID officials have remained skeptical of the
contributions which the private sector can make to economic development
abroad. Therefore, not only must policy priorities be set from the highest
level and carried out through the organizations, but also the various
departments must be organized so as to seek and utilize the inputs from
business itself.
For their part, not all TNC's have shown a willingness to play by the
rules, and few are adequately organized to receive, assess, appreciate and
respond to governmental initiatives for the creation of an appropriate
dialogue.52 Most of the communicative arts of the TNC's are utilized for
"public affairs" or "public relations," asserting the view of the corporation
on issues which affect it. Little emphasis is placed on a flow of views from
the external environment into the decisionmaking process of the com-
panies, altering its orientations or operations; the few companies which do
have such networks are clearly exceptions. No less ineffective are the
industry or trade associations which seek to speak on public issues. Their
organization is too complex with many diverse views of their members, and
only a few have a significant standing with top government officials; they
have no standing with foreign governments.
5 3
Business itself, therefore, will have to reorganize its channels for
communication, placing a higher priority at top levels on government-
51For the most part, the sole input the the government is through the rather informal
Washington representative/international who transmits company viewpoints to legislators
and civil servants. Only a few international companies have a Washington representa-
tive, international, however. See P. CHERRINGTON & R. GILLEN, THE BUSINEss REPRESENTATIVE
IN WASHINGTON (1962); Johnson, The Washington Representative, MICH. Bus. REv., May,
1971, at 6.
;,'See J. BEUIRMAN, J. BODDEWYN & A. KAPOOR. INTERNATIONAt. BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT
COMNIMUNICATIONS (1975).
53A singular exception is the Business and Industry Advisory Committee, attached to the
OECD, through which companies and various organizations speak on issues coming before
that organization. However, there is relatively little formal business input into the agencies
affiliated with the United Natios or into the various United Nations commissions themselves.
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business communication on the new rules for the international economy
and their implementation. One of the mechanisms for accomplishing this
would be the creation of a new business group which would coordinate and
stimulate dialogues between the TNC's and foreign governments, so as to
enhance the appreciation of the latter of the abilities of the TNC's and the
tradeoffs which would be necessary in improving their contributions to the
interest of the host governments. Still wider interests, for example, labor,
consumer and ecological interests, must also be included. Some business-
government dialogues presently take place on an ad hoc basis. What is
needed is a more concerted effort to explain to governments, especially in
developing countries, how the international companies operate and the
constraints under which they make their decisions. If the rules are to be
changed, a careful assessment should be made beforehand of the effect of
various changes; otherwise, what is sought is not likely to be achieved.
CONCLUSION
The concerns of governments over the spread of the multinational
entrprises and other types of transnational corporations has led to
continuing complaints and efforts to constrain their activities. The
purpose of the foregoing analysis has been to demonstrate that these
complaints would be best met by a positive attitude of redirecting the ME's
to pressing problems in the international economy. If this were done,
many existing complaints would likely fade away. An appropriate code of
conduct would simply be written into whatever arrangements were made
for international integration or for the use of such companies respecting
special problems, such as the development of the seabed. In addition,
complaints about interference by the United States Government through
the companies would be reduced, since the degree of participation would
already be determined by the new rules for the international division of
labor and the role of the multinationals therein.
Similarly, pressures to unbundle the contributions of the TNC's would
be dissipated in the recognition that the packaging of TNC contributions is
a signal contribution to their efficiency.54 Attempts to force joint ventures
on ME's would cease in the face of recognition of the value of its
integrating activities. And, concern over restrictive business practices
would be diminished by prior agreement as to the way in which particular
arrangements were to be carried out-such as the production consortia with
Eastern European countries. Concerns over the types of technologies
transferred and for support for indigenous research and development
activities would be assuaged by agreed provisions concerning these activi-
ties. Arrangements for exploitation of the seabed or for the development of
54See J. BEHRMAN & H. WALLENDER, TRANSFER OF MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY WITHIN
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1976).
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regional integration within a particular industrial sector can more easily
and effectively follow.
In sum, a more positive and forthcoming attitude, focusing on the use
of ME's in international industrial policies would divert the attention from
the surface phenomena or symptoms. Efforts to treat these problems by
"codes of conduct" will leave frustration and dissatisfaction because the
underlying problems will not be addressed. Attention should be directed to
the goals of the NIEO and the role of the ME's therein, so as to achieve
both efficiency and greater equity in the international economy.

